When will Britain face up to its crimes against humanity?

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When will Britain face up to its crimes against humanity?












A sculpture called Gilt of Cain, by artist Michael Visocchi and poet Lemn Sissay, commemorating the 2007 bicentenary of the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade. Photograph: Graeme Robertson/The Guardian
After the abolition of slavery, Britain paid millions in compensation – but every penny of it went to slave owners, and nothing to those they enslaved. We must stop overlooking the brutality of British history. By











Main image: A sculpture called Gilt of Cain, by artist Michael Visocchi and poet Lemn Sissay, commemorating the 2007 bicentenary of the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade. Photograph: Graeme Robertson/The Guardian

On 3 August 1835, somewhere in the City of London, two of Europe’s most famous bankers came to an agreement with the chancellor of the exchequer. Two years earlier, the British government had passed the Slavery Abolition Act, which outlawed slavery in most parts of the empire. Now it was taking out one of the largest loans in history, to finance the slave compensation package required by the 1833 act. Nathan Mayer Rothschild and his brother-in-law Moses Montefiore agreed to loan the British government £15m, with the government adding an additional £5m later. The total sum represented 40% of the government’s yearly income in those days, equivalent to some £300bn today.











You might expect this so-called “slave compensation” to have gone to the freed slaves to redress the injustices they suffered. Instead, the money went exclusively to the owners of slaves, who were being compensated for the loss of what had, until then, been considered their property. Not a single shilling of reparation, nor a single word of apology, has ever been granted by the British state to the people it enslaved, or their descendants.
Today, 1835 feels so long ago; so far away. But if you are a British taxpayer, what happened in that quiet room affects you directly. Your taxes were used to pay off the loan, and the payments only ended in 2015. Generations of Britons have been implicated in a legacy of financial support for one of the world’s most egregious crimes against humanity.
The fact that you, and your parents, and their parents in turn, may have been paying for a huge slave-owner compensation package from the 1830s only came to public attention last month. The revelation came on 9 February, in the form of a tweet by HM Treasury: “Here’s today’s surprising #FridayFact. Millions of you have helped end the slave trade through your taxes. Did you know? In 1833, Britain used £20 million, 40% of its national budget, to buy freedom for all slaves in the Empire. The amount of money borrowed for the Slavery Abolition Act was so large that it wasn’t paid off until 2015. Which means that living British citizens helped pay to end the slave trade.”
The tweet, which the Treasury says was prompted by a Freedom of Information Act request submitted in January, generated a storm of anger and crowdsourced corrections. First, the British slave trade was not abolished in 1833, but in 1807. Second, slavery was not abolished in all parts of the British empire in 1833. The new law applied to the British Caribbean islands, Mauritius and the Cape Colony, in today’s South Africa, but not to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) or British India, for instance. Third, no freedom was “bought” for plantation slaves in 1833, as the enslaved were compelled to work in unfreedom, without pay and under the constant threat of punishment, until 1838. Most importantly, the Treasury’s tweet did not mention that generations of British taxpayers had been paying off a loan that had been used to compensate slave owners, rather than slaves.
The tweet, which was hastily deleted, had the stench of British historical amnesia and of institutionalised racism. A few days later, the historian David Olusoga wrote: “[This] is what happens when those communities for whom this history can never be reduced to a Friday factoid remain poorly represented within national institutions.”
The tweet was no aberration. It was emblematic of the way legacies of slavery continue to shape life for the descendants of the formerly enslaved, and for everyone who lives in Britain, whatever their origin. The legacies of slavery in Britain are not far off; they are in front of our eyes every single day.
We can only begin to understand slavery’s influence on Britain today by first allowing 500 years of human history to flash before our eyes. Beginning in the last decades of the 1400s, we see African people kidnapped from their families, crammed into the dark pits of slave forts, and then piled into the bowels of ships. We see voyagers and traders, such as John Hawkins in the 1560s, becoming some of the first British men to make massive fortunes from this trade in kidnapped Africans. By the late 17th century, we see the British coming to dominate the slave trade, having overtaken the Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch. We see tens of thousands of merchant ships making the “middle passage”, the voyage across the Atlantic that transformed captives from Africa into American slave commodities. Half of all the Africans transported into slavery during the 18th century were carried in the holds of British ships.












From the 15th to the 19th centuries, more than 11 million shackled black captives were forcibly transported to the Americas, and unknown multitudes were lost at sea. Captives were often thrown overboard when they were too sick, or too strong-willed, or too numerous to feed. Those who survived the journey were dumped on the shores and sold to the highest bidder, then sold on again and again like financial assets. Mothers were separated from children, and husbands from wives, as persons were turned into property. Slaves were raped and lynched; their bodies were branded, flayed and mutilated. Many slave owners, in their diaries, manuals, newspaper writings and correspondence, readily admitted the punishments and violations they exacted on black people on the cane fields and in their homes. Take, for example, the unapologetic recollections of violence and predation that comprise the diary of Thomas Thistlewood, a British slave owner in Jamaica in the mid-1700s. Thistlewood recorded 3,852 acts of sexual intercourse with 136 enslaved women in his 37 years in Jamaica. In his 23 July 1756 entry, he described punishing a slave in the following manner: “Gave him a moderate whipping, pickled him well, made Hector shit in his mouth, immediately put a gag in it whilst his mouth was full and made him wear it 4 or 5 hours.”











Slave trade routes in the 17th century.
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Slave trade routes in the 17th century. Photograph: Alamy
In Barbados, the British established one of the first modern slave societies. Slavery had certainly been practised in many parts of the world since ancient times. But never before had a territory’s entire economy been based on slave labour for capitalist industry. Beginning in 1627, the enslaved were put to work in the intense cultivation of sugar cane, working in chain gangs in shifts that covered a 24-hour production cycle. In one of the greatest experiments in human terror the world has ever known, this system of plantation slavery expanded over the following centuries across the Caribbean, South America and the southern United States. Fear and torture were used to drive black workers to cut, mill, boil and “clay” the sugar, so it could be shipped to Britain as part of a lucrative “triangle of trade” between the west coast of Africa, the Americas and Britain. The trade in slaves, and the goods they were forced to produce – sugar, tobacco and eventually cotton – created the first lords of modern capitalism.
Britain could not have become the most powerful economic force on earth by the turn of the 19th century without commanding the largest slave plantation economies on earth, with more than 800,000 people enslaved. And the legacy of such large-scale, prolonged slavery touches everything that is familiar in Britain today, including buildings named after slave owners such as Colston Hall in Bristol; streets named after slave owners such as Buchanan and Dunlop Streets in Glasgow; and whole parts of cities built for slave owners, such as the West India Docks in London. The cultural legacy of slavery also infuses British tastes, from sweetened tea, to silver service, to cotton clothwork, to the endemic race and class inequalities that characterise everyday life.
Britain’s central role in 500 years of the slave trade and plantation slavery is often dissolved like a bitter pill into the much more palatable tonic of the nation’s role in the story of abolition. This narrative often begins in the pews of Holy Trinity Church in Clapham, where the cherubic William Wilberforce worshipped. Today, he can be seen on the stained glass above the altar of that church, giving the news of the 1807 abolition of the slave trade to a black woman who kneels before him. Around Wilberforce coalesced a group of Church of England social reformers, known as the Clapham Saints, who led the campaign against the slave trade, and then pressed onward to fight for the abolition of plantation slavery in 1833. Over the past few decades, scholars have also stressed the ways in which the antislavery movement depended on expanding democratic participation in civic debate, with British women and the working classes playing a crucial role in the abolitionist ranks. British parliamentarians were inundated with thousands of petitions from ordinary people pressing them to pass laws that eventually brought slavery to an end.











William Wilberforce
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The British abolitionist William Wilberforce. Photograph: Print Collector/Getty Images
Abolitionists in Britain maintained that slavery was a violation of God’s will. Since every human being possessed a soul, they argued that no human being could be made into another man’s possession without also perverting the divine plan. To encourage their fellow citizens to look into the face of the enslaved and see fellow human beings, British abolitionists distributed autobiographies of people who had experienced slavery, such as works by Ignatius Sancho, Olaudah Equiano and Mary Prince. If only the British public could hear the voices of black people through their writing, then they could empathise with their oppression. It would then become possible to look into the eyes of the enslaved and see a person staring back.
But narratives of abolition cannot be reduced to a story of angelic white benefactors gifting freedom to their black wards. (There are 32 images of William Wilberforce in the National Portrait Gallery, but just four images of black abolitionists and antislavery activists from the same period.) In Britain, the popular narrative too often ignores the fact that blacks on the plantations were convinced of their own personhood long before anyone else. Rebellions were endemic to slavery, and by the 1810s and 20s, many slave societies in the British Caribbean were experiencing insurgencies. Enslaved people rebelled in Barbados in 1816, and Demerara (today’s Guyana) in 1823. Shortly after Christmas 1831, an audacious rebellion broke out in Jamaica. Some 60,000 enslaved people went on strike. They burned the sugar cane in the fields and used their tools to smash up sugar mills. The rebels also showed remarkable discipline, imprisoning slave owners on their estates without physically harming them.
The British Jamaican government responded by violently stamping out the rebellion, killing more than 540 black people in combat, and later with firing squads and on the gallows. The uprising sent shockwaves through the British parliament and accelerated the push for the abolition of slavery. Henry Taylor, head of the West India division of the British Colonial Office, later commented, “this terrible event [of the rebellion]… was indirectly a death blow to slavery”.
Not only did blacks mobilise for their own liberation, but by the 1820s slavery was also beginning to clash with an economic principle that was becoming an article of faith for British capitalists: free trade. Eric Williams, a historian of slavery who also became the first prime minister of independent Trinidad in 1962, has argued that slavery in the British empire was only abolished after it had ceased to be economically useful. Many British merchants involved in selling Cuban, Brazilian and East Indian sugar in Britain wanted to see an end to all duties and protections that safeguarded the West Indian sugar monopoly. British capitalists also saw fresh possibilities for profit across the globe, from South America to Australia, as new transportation and military technologies – steamships, gunboats and railways – made it possible for European settlers to penetrate new frontiers. The economic system of British slavery was moribund by 1833, but it still needed to be officially slain.
By 1830, debates were raging in the British parliament, and in the public sphere, about ending slavery. The powerful West India interest – a group of around 80 MPs who had ties to Caribbean slavery – opposed abolition. They were joined by an additional group of some 10 MPs who did not possess slaves themselves, but still opposed any proposal to tamper with slave owners’ right to property – that property, in this case, being human beings. The faction presented “compensated emancipation”, or the payment of money to slave owners at abolition, as a way of upholding property rights. Beyond parliament, many thousands of Britons across the country – slave owners, West India merchants, sugar refiners, trade brokers, ship owners, bankers, military men, members of the gentry and clergymen – actively championed the principle of compensation by attending public rallies organised by various West India Committees.
This notion of “compensated emancipation” was relatively new. When slaves were emancipated in northern US states in the years before 1804, no compensation to their owners was paid. Only in the 1810s did the British government take the unprecedented step of paying compensation to Spain, Portugal and some West African states to solicit their cooperation in the suppression of the slave trade. The attempt failed, however, as Spain and Portugal pocketed British money and continued their slave trading until the later 19th century. British slave owners nonetheless demanded, in the 1830s, that this international precedent be applied to them.
The argument for slave-owner compensation relied on perverse logic. Under English law, it was difficult to claim compensation for the loss of chattel property, since rights to movable things – such as household possessions, or tools, or livestock – were considered inherently unstable, expendable and ambiguous. So, the West India interest in parliament, led by the likes of Patrick Maxwell Stewart, a rich London merchant who owned slaves in Tobago, made fanciful arguments to align the enslaved more with land or buildings, or even with body parts, than with human beings. According to one line of argument, because the government paid money to landowners when it took over fields for public works such as docks, roads, bridges and railways, so too it had to pay slave owners for taking over their slaves. According to another argument, because the government paid soldiers for the injury to organs or the loss of limbs during war, so too it had to provide slave owners aid for cutting them off from their slaves, which maimed slave owners’ economic interests.











West India Quay in London.
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West India Quay in London. Photograph: Alamy
Many mainstream abolitionists felt uncomfortable about the compensation of slave owners, but justified it as a pragmatic, if imperfect, way to achieve a worthy goal. Other abolitionists, especially a vanguard group within the Anti-Slavery Society called the “Agency Committee”, railed against the idea. “It would reconcile us to the crime,” wrote one contributor to the Anti-Slavery Monthly Report in 1829. “It would be a sap on public virtue,” wrote another the following year. Some activists even demanded that compensation be paid to the enslaved. “To the slave-holder, nothing is due; to the slave, everything,” said an antislavery pamphlet in 1826. Many antislavery members of parliament, such as Thomas Fowell Buxton and William Clay, spoke out vociferously against slave-owner compensation. Hundreds of petitions were also sent in by the corps of abolitionists beyond the ramparts of the political elite, insisting that no money go to the perpetrators of crimes against God’s will.
The decision to compensate slave owners was not just an inevitable expression of the widespread beliefs of those times. Political decisions reflect who is in the room when the decisions are being made. The Reform Act of 1832 drastically transformed the British electoral system and extended the franchise, to the detriment of the West India interest. But even in the reformed House of Commons, scores of MPs still had close financial or family ties to slave ownership. On the other hand, it bears remembering that the first black Britons were not elected to the House of Commons until near the end of the following century, more than 150 years later.
Other slave-owning states, including France, Denmark, the Netherlands and Brazil, would follow the British example of compensated emancipation in the coming decades. But the compensation that Britain paid to its slave owners was by far the most generous. Britain stood out among European states in its willingness to appease slave owners, and to burden future generations of its citizens with the responsibility of paying for it.
The owners of slaves in British society were not just the super-rich. Recent research by historians at University College London has shown the striking diversity of the people who received compensation, from widows in York to clergymen in the Midlands, attorneys in Durham to glass manufacturers in Bristol. Still, most of the money ended up in the pockets of the richest citizens, who owned the greatest number of slaves. More than 50% of the total compensation money went to just 6% of the total number of claimants. The benefits of slave-owner compensation were passed down from generation to generation of Britain’s elite. Among the descendants of the recipients of slave-owner compensation is the former prime minister David Cameron.
The decision to emancipate slaves by treating them like property, and not like persons, was no mere theoretical exercise. Rather than putting a sudden end to their suffering, the process of emancipation marked a new phase of British atrocities and the terrorisation of blacks.
The emancipation process was minutely orchestrated by government bureaucrats. In September 1835, less than a month after the government received its loan, slave owners began their feeding frenzy as they obtained compensation cheques at the National Debt Office. Payment amounts were determined based on application forms that asked claimants to itemise the number and kinds of enslaved people in their possession, and to provide certificates from the slave registrar. There were some 47,000 recipients of compensation in total.
In addition to money, slave owners received another form of compensation: the guaranteed free labour of blacks on plantations for a period of years after emancipation. The enslaved were thus forced to pay reverse reparations to their oppressors. At the stroke of midnight on 1 August 1834, the enslaved were freed from the legal category of slavery – and instantly plunged into a new institution, called “apprenticeship”. The arrangement was initially to last for 12 years, but was ultimately shortened to four. During this period of apprenticeship, Britain declared it would teach blacks how to use their freedom responsibly, and would train them out of their natural state of savagery. But this training involved continued unpaid labour for the same masters on the very same plantations on which they had worked the day before.
In some ways, the “apprenticeship” years were arguably even more brutal than what had preceded them. With the Slavery Abolition Act, the duty to punish former slaves now shifted from individual slave owners to officers of the state. A state-funded, 100-person corps of police, jailers and enforcers was hired in Britain and sent to the plantation colonies. They were called the “stipendiary magistrates”. If apprentices were too slow in drawing water, or in cutting cane, or in washing linens, or if they took Saturdays off, their masters could have them punished by these magistrates.
Punishments were doled out according to a standardised formula, and often involved the most “modern” punishment device of those times: the treadmill. This torture device, which was supposed to inculcate a work ethic, was a huge turning wheel with thick, splintering wooden slats. Apprentices accused of laziness – what slave owners called the “negro disease” – were hung by their hands from a plank and forced to “dance” the treadmill barefoot, often for hours. If they fell or lost their step, they would be battered on their chest, feet and shins by the wooden planks. The punishment was often combined with whippings. The treadmill was used more during the apprenticeship period than it ever was under slavery, precisely because it was said to be a scientific, measurable and modern form of disciplinary re-education, in line with bureaucratic oversight. One apprentice, James Williams, in an account of his life published in 1837, recalled he was punished much more after 1834 than before. Indeed, it is likely that slave-owners sweated their labour under apprenticeship, in order to squeeze out the last ounces of unpaid labour before full emancipation finally came in 1838.
While the British state, even after emancipation, still failed to see black people as persons, the enslaved themselves inhabited a complex society of their own creation. Enslaved people called the experience of slavery “barbarity time”. And during the barbarity, they developed their own internal banking and legal systems. They created extensive trading relations between towns and villages, and across plantation enclaves. They had their own spiritual practices, such as Obeah, an Afro-centric repertoire of divination and social communion cultivated alongside the religion bestowed by the Christian missionaries. Slaves had their own rich musical forms and traditions of storytelling. They were engineers, chemists and medics on the plantation fields they inhabited. Many of their innovations contributed to making life under slavery livable, such as the architectural design of the tapia house in Trinidad. Even if the official white gaze could not see the 800,000 persons that lived in the plantation colonies, those persons still persisted.
Benjamin Disraeli, the great Tory prime minister of the late 19th century, once described the “forlorn Antilles”, or Caribbean, as millstones around the neck of Britain. Here in Disraeli’s remark, is the British habit of externalising the problem of slavery as playing out in some distant place, rather than within Britain’s own heart of darkness. Today, evading the question of British slave legacies takes the form of celebratory national narratives about British abolition, and in the nervous reflex of switching the topic to “modern slavery” whenever the history of British slavery is raised for discussion. Slavery becomes comfortable for the British nation if it can be situated “out there”, among the dark-skinned peoples of the earth, in countries far away.
It is hardly surprising, then, that the British establishment has been so resistant to hearing calls for reparations for slavery. In 1997, manacled human remains were found on a beach in Devon. It was soon determined that the bones were those of enslaved blacks who had probably been kept in the hold of The London, a vessel shipwrecked in 1796. The enslaved people, who were probably from the Caribbean, were supposed to be sold on the British slave market. Labour MP Bernie Grant, a reparations advocate and one of the first black members of parliament, took the occasion to make a pilgrimage to Devon, and to renew the call for reparations.
Grant’s programme began with the demand for an apology from the British state for the legacies of British slavery. “I am going to write to the Queen,” Grant had said in a speech in Birmingham in 1993. “I know she is a very reasonable woman.” He died in 2000 without ever receiving that very reasonable apology.
In 2013, a powerful renewed call for reparations arose among representatives of Caribbean nations, stimulated by the publication of the book Britain’s Black Debt. The following year, its author, Hilary Beckles, vice-chancellor of the University of the West Indies, and chair of the Caribbean Reparations Commission, gave an address to a group of British MPs and peers in the UK parliament’s British-Caribbean all-party group. His voice booming across Committee Room 14, Beckles argued that Britain has a “case to answer in respect of reparatory justice”.











British prime minister David Cameron on a visit to Kingston, Jamaica
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British prime minister David Cameron on a visit to Kingston, Jamaica. Photograph: Stefan Rousseau/PA
He anchored his demand for reparations in the need for the British state to admit its role in forcefully extracting wealth from the Caribbean, impeding industrialisation and causing chronic poverty. The Caribbean, by the late 20th century, became one of the largest centres of predatory lending, orchestrated by the IMF and World Bank, as well as by European and American banks. Even today, the economies of Jamaica, Barbados and Antigua find themselves dangling precariously between life and debt, suspended by their historically enforced dependence on foreign finance.
The legacies of slavery and racism are no less present in Britain, where black workers are more than twice as likely than white workers to work in temporary or insecure forms of employment. While 3% of Britain’s general population is black, black people comprise 12% of the incarcerated. And people of colour are still hugely underrepresented in positions of power in Britain – in politics, academia and the judiciary, in particular.
Six months after Beckles’ speech, the Treasury finally finished repaying the debt on its Abolition of Slavery Act loan. And a further six months after that, in July 2015, then-prime minister David Cameron travelled to Jamaica on an official visit. There, on behalf of the British nation, he took a big leap backwards. It is time to “move on from this painful legacy and continue to build for the future,” he stated glibly.











But how can you move on from something that has not yet stopped happening? Neither the history of British slavery, nor the process of emancipation that re-enacted slavery, nor the bones of the enslaved that wash up on British shores, nor the debt for slave-owner compensation that continued for so long to cycle through British national accounts, seem ever to be able to bring the nation’s representatives to acknowledge its crimes against humanity and to provide restitution.
The scholar Christina Sharpe has written about the “residence time” of black bodies thrown into the dark sea during the “middle passage”. This is the span of time, measured in thousands of years, that it takes for the atoms of jettisoned slaves’ bodies to pass out of the oceanic system. The Atlantic is one kind of vault of slavery’s aftermath. But so too is the ocean of British national debt, through which the ghosts of the enslaved circulated for centuries, waiting for their moment of due reckoning; waiting for an apology from the British state, and for its commitment to redress what British slavery sought to obliterate: the personhood of black folk who emerged out of this empire, like me and my ancestors.
• This article was amended on 29 March 2018. An earlier version stated incorrectly that the Wills Memorial Building in Bristol was named after slave-owners. It was named after a merchant whose family’s business profited from the slave trade.

Measuring Worth, inflation rates, saving calculator, relative value, worth of a dollar, worth of a pound, purchasing power, gold prices, GDP, history of wages, average wage, real wage, growth calculator



Measuring Slavery in 2016 Dollars*
by

Samuel H. Williamson
Miami University MeasuringWorth
sam@mswth.org

and

Louis P. Cain
Loyola University Chicago
Northwestern University
lcain@northwestern.edu
Slavery was an ancient practice on the North American continent. Within the colonies that became the United States, slavery first appeared in Virginia in 1619.1 It was legal in all the British colonies, but it was practiced on a larger scale in what became the US South and the British Islands of the Caribbean. African slavery in the South was largely a response to the greater demand for labor on tobacco, rice, and indigo plantations. Northern farms were generally smaller, family-sized plots of land with the family supplying most of the labor. Before the American Revolution, there was no significant movement for abolition. By the early 1800s, most Northern states had passed laws in favor of abolition, but the acts called for gradual abolition.
In the South, on the other hand, slavery became an ingrained economic and legal institution. Slaves and their progeny were the property of an owner, and slaves were owned until they died. They could be bought and sold; their owners controlled their lives and those of their children. When slaves were sold, the contract was a legal document, even to the extent that a buyer could sue the seller if a slave was sold under false pretenses. Even slaves themselves had some protection under the law; they could not be abandoned or executed.
Before independence, the laws of the colonies could not be inconsistent with English law. Chief Justice Lord William Mansfield in the Somersett case (heard in London in 1772) held that English law did not support slavery, a ruling that eventually led to the peaceful extinction of African slavery in the British Empire. By then, the Americans were on a different path. In the Constitutional Convention discussions of 1787, it was held that slavery was not a moral issue but a matter of "interest" only. Some delegates believed that slavery was going to die out. Virginia had attempted several times unilaterally to end the slave trade to Virginia ports, but the Board of Trade lawyers in London had overruled it. The federal government prohibited the trade in slaves beginning in 1808, but statesmanship and jurisprudence could not find a way to end the institution. Within a decade of the Constitutional Convention, Eli Whitney's cotton gin appeared, which is popularly credited with sparking an explosion in cotton production in the South. This explanation may be partly true, but it is also the case that the technological improvements in spinning and weaving in England created a big increase in the demand for cotton, a cloth much preferred to wool. These events together reenergized the demand for slaves.
Slavery is a subject that most Americans have confronted as part of their education, but there are many aspects of slavery that have been left to the dim mists of history. This paper will review some of the basic dimensions of the economics of slavery in the United States and put them in perspective by showing what the financial magnitudes of the "peculiar institution" might be in the relative prices of today. In particular, in 1860 there were nearly four million slaves and their average market value was around $800, but what does that mean?2 How much would that be in today's dollars? Answers to such questions are not simple.
Comments posted to MeasuringWorth (see the appendix) indicate there is considerable current public interest -- and public confusion -- in regard to such questions. Our intention is to present, for the first time, macroeconomic and microeconomic dimensions of slavery in values measured by today's dollars. We are addressing two audiences: the public who know relatively little about these dimensions, and the specialists who may have forgotten that the relative magnitude of these dimensions would be conservatively described as large.


Why does anything have value?

A monetary value can be measured by a transaction when something is bought and sold, or as an expected value of an asset currently held. Some assets have value because of the potential income they can generate. An example would be a piece of capital equipment, such as a cotton gin for which planters would pay to have their cotton processed, or a slave who would pick the cotton.
Other assets may have value because of their potential resale value, such as land or a rare painting. The owners of a painting choose to have part of wealth invested in something that does not generate current income, either because of an expectation that it will appreciate or because they wish to "consume" the pleasure of owning it. These assets also may give their owner status and power. Owning a Rembrandt painting gives one bragging rights among art collectors. Owning half the acres in the county gives one lots of influence in local politics, regardless of whether the acres are in production or not.


What is the motivation for owning a slave;
what determines the price of a slave at a given point in time?

The demand for a slave is a derived demand, as is that for any productive resource. It is derived from the demand for the output that resource helps to produce. There was an active market for slaves throughout the antebellum period, meaning that slave owners believed the purchase of a slave would prove to be a profitable expenditure, even though that expenditure required a considerable amount of money3. As we will explain below, at the time the South seceded from the Union, the purchase of a single slave represented as much as $150,000 and more in today's prices. This was twice the average of 14 years earlier, indicating a sustained growth in the demand for slaves. Economists would say that these observations alone indicate that the profitability of "investing" in a slave was increasing substantially.
Why would a slave have so much value? A short answer is the value of a slave is the value of the expected output or services the slave can generate minus the costs of maintaining that person (i.e., food, clothing, shelter, etc.) over his or her lifetime.4. A quick list of the data that have to be considered in determining the value of a slave's expected revenue would include sex, age, location, how much he or she is likely to produce (a factor that included a slave's health and physical condition), and the price of the output in the market. For a female slave, an additional thing to consider would be the value of the children she might bear.
In addition, there is considerable evidence that slaves were worked harder than free labor in Southern agriculture; what slaves could be induced to produce in bondage was greater than what they could be expected to produce with the freedom to make their own choice of labor or leisure.5
As these outputs and costs are in the future, they must be discounted to their present value, so an owner must choose a discount rate. And, as they are in the future, there is uncertainty in determining what they are, so the present value of a slave is an estimate made by the current owner6. In general, most economic historians believe that slavery was profitable, even at these expensive prices.
Figure 1 demonstrates how the price of slaves varied with respect to age, sex, and location during the antebellum period. As one can see, prices were higher in the New South than in the Old South (the states along the Atlantic coast) and higher for males than for females7. The statistics on slave prices show that healthy young adult men in the prime of their working lives had the highest price, followed by females in the childbearing years. Young adult males had more value as they were stronger, could work harder in the fields, and could be expected to work at such a level for more years. Young adult women had value over and above their ability to work in the fields; they were able to have children who by law were also slaves of the owner of the mother. Old and infirm slaves had low, even "negative," prices because their maintenance costs were potentially higher than the value of their production. Similarly, young children had low prices because the "cost" of raising them usually exceeded their annual production until they became teenagers.
Figure 1
Age-Sex Profile of Slave Values
Louisiana Male 18-30 = 100
Age-Sex Profile of Slave Values
Source: Source: Historical Statistics, Table Bb215-218. Index of slave values, by age, sex, and region: 1850. All the values are indexed to that of Louisiana males aged 18-30.

Those who have researched slave prices have discovered that a large number of additional variables went into the determination of the price of any particular slave at a particular point in time. A premium was paid if the slave was an artisan -- particularly a blacksmith (+55%), a carpenter (+45%), a cook (+20%), or possessed other domestic skills (+15%). On the other hand, a slave's price was discounted if the person was known to be a runaway (-60%), was crippled (-60%), had a vice such as drinking (-50%), or was physically impaired (-30%). In general, the discount for each of the slaves was slightly larger for females than for males.8. The prices presented above are average prices for the slaves transacted in a given year. A person studying their family's history might come across a notation that a family member purchased a slave at a given price or that a family member purchased their freedom at a given price. Without information regarding these details, it is difficult to interpret what the price of a single slave means.
The path of the average of slave prices can be seen in Figure 2. While much of the movement can be explained by what is happening in the cotton market, the first two spikes are also related to general economic conditions. During and after the War of 1812 there was a 40% increase in all prices, with the price of raw cotton more than doubling during the same period. In the 1830s, the price of slaves increased quickly due to expectations bred by discussions to refund the federal budget surplus to the states. Discussions about "internal improvements" (e.g., canals and railroads) led to a boom in land prices and, once again, cotton prices. After the "Panic of 1837" there was a long depression. Finally, the almost three-fold increase in prices after 1843 can be explained by several factors, including the rapid increase in the worldwide demand for cotton and increased productivity in the New South attributable to better soil and improvements in the cotton plant. It is clear during this time that the market for slaves was active, and that slaves were regarded as more valuable.
Figure 2
Average Price of a Slave Over Time
Current dollars
Average Price of a Slave over Time
Source: Historical Statistics, Table Bb212. Average Slave Price.


What is the comparable "value" of a slave in today's prices?

None of these prices has much meaning to us today, but they would if we revalue them in today's dollars to the amount of money slave owners spent 150 years ago.9. The techniques developed in MeasuringWorth have created ten "measures" to use to compare a monetary value in one period to one in another, as explained in the essay "Measures of Worth."10 Of those ten, three are useful for discussing the value of a slave. They are: labor or income value, relative earnings and real price11. Using these measures, the value in 2016 of $400 in 1850 (the average price of a slave that year) ranges from $12,500 to $205,000.


Labor or Income Value
Figure 3
Labor Income Value
of Owning a Slave in 2016 Prices
Labor Income Value of Owning a Slave in 2016 Prices
As discussed above, the $400 price in 1850 represents the expected net value of the future labor services a slave would provide. This embedded meaning is why the labor or income value is the correct measure of the value of a slave's services in today's prices. That $400 would be $92,000 in today's prices.
While some slaves were rented out for farm and other types of work, most slaves worked on the farms and plantations of their owners. In both cases, the work they did was mostly unskilled, so a comparable measure of the value of these services is refeclted in the unskilled wage.12. In other words, we can assume that to hire a free employee to do the work of a slave would cost the unskilled wage of that day. Thus, a measure of the average value of a slave would be the present value of the net rental cost over the life expectancy of the average slave.
Thus the value in today's dollars of a slave during the antebellum period ranges from $50,000 (in 1809) to $150,000 of a slave's expected revenue less maintenance costs. If we assume, for example, that the average slave will live 20 more years, then today's price for a slave valued at $400 in 1850 could be interpreted as the $92,000 in wages plus the 20 years of room, board, and clothing that it would take to hire an unskilled worker today to perform the lifetime services expected of a slave.13. Unlike hired hands, slaves were responsible in large part for producing their own room, board, and clothing. Given that the work week today is significantly shorter than in 1850 and that slaves were made to work harder during the same amount of time as free workers, it would take more than one hired hand today to replace the labor supplied by a slave then.
Even at these prices, some slaves, particularly those with artisan skills, might ultimately earn enough to buy themselves out of slavery. It was not uncommon, especially in the Old South, for masters to allow others to hire the services of his or her slaves. This was particularly true of slaves who lived in urban areas, independent of the master. They were expected to make their own arrangements. "The master fixed the wage that the slave must bring in. All above this amount the slave might keep himself.   Employers frequently hired the slave's time from the owner at a certain amount and paid the slave an additional wage contingent on amount of work accomplished."14
Figure 4
Relative Earnings
of Owning a Slave in 2016 Prices
Economic Status of Owning a Slave in 2016 Prices


The Relatve Earnings.
The $400 average slave price in 1850 can also be thought of as a signaling device of status in a period where the annual per capita income was about $110. relative earnings can be viewed as the ability to purchase expensive goods. Today, the middle and upper-middle classes aspire to goods and services such as a second home, servants, and an expensive car as a way of showing others that they have "arrived"-- that they have achieved some status in the economy. The average slave price in 1850 was roughly equal to the average price of a house, so the purchase of even one slave would have given the purchaser some status. Comparisons based on relative earnings are measured by the relative ratio of GDP per capita. Consequently $400 in those days corresponds to nearly $195,000 in relative earnings today.15
Figure 5
The Real Price of Owning a Slave
in 2016 Dollars
The Real Price of Owning a Slave in 2016 Dollars


Real Price
Economists commonly use the real price measure when they are trying to account for the impact of inflation. The real price today is computed by multiplying the value in the past by the increase in the consumer price index (CPI). The result compares that past value to a ratio of the cost of a fixed bundle of goods and services the average consumer buys in each of the two years. In the construction of the CPI bundle, an effort is made to compensate for quality changes in the mix of the bundle over time.16 Still, the longer the time span, the less consistent the comparison. In the 19th century, there were no national surveys to figure out what the average consumer bought. The earliest budget study used by economic historians was of 397 workmen's families in Massachusetts and was constructed in 1875. These families spent over half their income on food and rented their housing.17
The MeasuringWorth calculator shows that the "real price" of $400 in 1850 would be approximately $12,000 in 2016 prices. We all can identify with what that amount of money would buy today, but hardly anything we would spend $12,600 on today was available 160 years ago. $400 in 1860 would have purchased 4,800 pounds of bacon, 3,000 pounds of coffee, 1,600 pounds of butter, or 1,000 gallons of gin. It is unlikely, however, that this was the budget of the typical slave owner. Most of the food would be produced on the plantation, and housing would have been buildings constructed by the owner (and his slaves). The "opportunity cost" of the $400 for the slave owner would have been supplies for the plantation, or perhaps luxuries and travel.
Using the real price is not the correct index to use for measuring the value of a slave's labor services in today's prices. It does, however, give an idea of what the cost of purchasing a slave was in 2016 dollars. Thus, just before the start of the Civil War, the average real price of a slave in the United States was $23,000 in current dollars. There is ample evidence that there are several million of people enslaved today, even though slavery is not legal anywhere in the world. There are several organizations such as Anti-Slavery International that will point out that in many places today, slaves sell for as little as (or even less than) $100!


What was the distribution of slave ownership   from 1 to 2,000?

A second issue of interest is slave wealth in both micro- and macro-economic terms. Slaveholders were wealthy individuals both with respect to other Southerners and with respect to the whole country. At the time, the Census Bureau measured wealth in two forms: real estate and personal estate. The land and buildings of a slave plantation were real estate; the slaveholdings were part of personal estate. Together they sum to Total Estate (TE). On both dimensions, slaveholders were different from other Southerners. The average white Southern family in antebellum America lived on a small farm without slaves. Slave ownership was the exception, not the rule.
Table 1
Size Distribution of Farms - 1860
for farms of 3 or more improved acres)
acresnumberpercentcum %cum %
>10005,3640.27100.000.27
500 - 99920,3191.0499.731.31
100- 499487,04124.9198.6926.23
50 - 99608,87831.1473.7757.37
20 - 49616,55831.5442.6388.91
10 - 19162,1788.3011.0997.20
3 - 954,6762.802.80100.00
Source: Soltow, table 5.1
Let us begin by looking at land. Lee Soltow collected the data by "spin" sampling from the 1860 census.18 Following the US census, he defined a farm as involving at least 3 improved acres of land, and it should be noted that this is for farms throughout the United States, not just the South. The size distribution of farms is shown below.
"Number" is the number of farms in the interval. The stereotypical picture of slavery is that it involved a large plantation. Farms that were greater than 500 acres (there are 640 acres in a square mile) comprise just 1.31 percent of farms. The vast majority of farms were between 20 and 500 acres.
Table 2 shows that the distribution of slave ownership in Soltow's data is more skewed than land.
Table 2
Disbribution of Slaves and Estate Value among
Free Adult Males in South - 1860
Number ofNumberTotal
slavesslaveholderspercentcum %Estate
>100010.00005100.00
500 - 999130.00065100.00 $957,000
100 - 4992,2780.11100.00 $160,000
50 - 998,3670.4299.88 $  72,000
10 - 4997,3334.8999.46 $  17,200
5 - 1089,5564.5094.57 $    8,800
1 - 4187,3369.4190.07 $    3,670
01,605,11680.6680.66 $          -  
Source: Soltow (1975), table 5.3
Over 80 percent of the free adult males in the South did not own slaves. Only 0.11 percent owned more than 100. The total estate for those in the upper tail of the distribution was enormous. It should be emphasized that this is not a small elite; as a group, slave owners were sizeable and wealthy. Those with more than 500 slaves were essentially millionaires in the current dollars of 1860.
Soltow calculated the Total Estate for free adult males at each of the break points in the distribution of slaves reported above. Soltow reports that the average Total Estate in the South in 1860 was $3978, as compared to just $2040 in the North.19 Given that the average slave price in 1860 was $800, if Southern wealth was exclusively slaves, that amount would equate to just over 5 slaves. Total estate, however, also includes real estate, and Soltow reports that amount actually involves an average of 2 slaves. Thus, according to the table above, 90.07 percent of free adult males in the South owned fewer slaves than implied by average wealth. In 1860, the top one percent of wealth holders held 27 percent of total estate; the bottom 50 percent held but one percent of the total.
In Figure 6 below, we see how the distribution of total estate in the South compared to that in the North in 1860. The data again come from Soltow's sampling. As one can see, there is almost no difference between the North and the South at the top of the distribution. The North is slightly above the South at the 0.001 level, but they are even at the 0.01 level. The largest planters were as wealthy as the major Northern merchants and industrialists. Between .01 and .10 levels, the South forges ahead before the North begins to close the gap. In both areas, the bottom 50% of the wealth distribution held but 1% of measured wealth. The evidence suggests that a Southern white farm family of four (a husband, wife, and two children) who owned a slave family of four had more wealth than a Northern white farm family of four that employed a couple of farm laborers. Non-slaveowners in the South were probably little different from Northern farmers. The aggregate share of the top 10% of the wealth distribution of Southern wealth is seven percentage points more than the top 10% of the Northern distribution (75% vs. 68%).
Figure 6
Wealth Distribution 1860
North vs. South
Wealth Distribution 1860 North vs. South


What is the comparable "value" of the wealth in slaves in today's prices?

Of the ten "measures" developed by MeasuringWorth, two are useful for discussing the value of the wealth invested in slaves. They are: relative earnings and economic power. We discussed the concept of relative earnings in relation to evaluating a slave's price above, but it is also useful for discussing wealth, as people with high relative earnings are typically people of wealth.


Economic Power.
Economic power usually connotes wealth. The people who are the financial and political leaders of a community are often its most wealthy. Even if they have not been elected to power, the wealthy often have disproportionate influence on those who do. The MeasuringWorth definition of economic power is to compare the value of something as a percent of total GDP between then and now. Thus, for example, the $800 slave price would be $2.6 million today. While this number seems very large, as we will show below, the wealth tied up in slaves was a large proportion of the total wealth of the nation. Slave owners as a group had considerable economic power.20
It is interesting to note that the economic power of owning one slave was much higher earlier in the century   as high as $8 million. This finding is consistent with the history of the period when southern states exercised great influence on such issues as tariffs, banking, and which new areas of the country would allow slavery. As the century progresses, the "power measure" of owning a single slave declines because industrialization and agriculture in North are growing faster than the slave economy.
The estates of slave owners were quite large, as is demonstrated when measured in current dollars. Table 3 shows the relative earnings and power of their estates in 2016 dollars.
Table 3
Distribution of Total Estate among Slaveholders
Number of Slaves
Total Estate (thousands of 1860 Dollars)
Relative Earnings  (millions of 2016 $)
Economic Power  (millions of 2016 $)
>1000
NR
-
-
500 - 999
$         957
$        386
$     3,930
100 - 499
$         160
$          65
$        658
50 - 999
$           72
$         29
$        296
10 - 49
$           17
$            7
$          70
5 - 10
$             9
$            4
$          37
Comparing these two tables, it becomes quite clear that the holder of 10 slaves likely ranks in the top one percent of the distribution, if relative earnings is used as the standard of comparison. Potentially all slaveholders rank in the top one percent, if economic power is used as the standard of comparison. Clearly, the ownership of even one slave implied that the owner was a wealthy member of the community. Those who owned over 500 slaves had a measure of economic power that compares to billionaires today.


How much wealth was invested in slaves?

Slaves had an important impact on the differences in regional wealth. Gavin Wright made estimates of both Northern and Southern wealth. His data for 1850 and 1860 are reported in the table below. The "value of slaves" figures are taken from Sutch and Ransom (1988).21
Table 4


Regional Wealth in 1850 and 1860
Millions of dollars (except per capita)

North
South
North
South

1850
1850
1860
1860
Total Wealth
$4,474
$2,844
$9,786
$6,332
Value of Slaves

$1,286
$3,059
Non-slave Wealth
$4,474
$1,559
$9,786
$3,273




Wealth (free) per capita
$315
$483
$482
$868
Non-slave (free) Wealth per capita
$315
$174
$482
$294




Source Wright (2006), p. 60.
A significant proportion of the wealth of slave owners was eliminated by the stroke of Abraham Lincoln's pen when he signed the Emancipation Proclamation that freed slaves in the rebellious areas. Success on the battlefield ensured their freedom. Remember that the Emancipation Proclamation freed slaves only in areas in rebellion not all slaves. More fundamentally, it was success on the battlefield that eliminated this wealth. Total slave wealth was immense. Figure 7 shows the aggregate value of slaves adjusted to today's prices measured using the relative share of GDP. While it varies with the price of slaves over the period, it is never less than six trillion 2016 dollars and, at the time of Emancipation, was close to thirteen trillion 2016 dollars.
Figure 7
Wealth in Slaves in Trillions of 2016 dollars
As Measured by the Share of the GDP
Wealth in Slaves in Trillions of 2016 dollars As Measured by the Share of the GDP
An alternative way of making that calculation is to use Soltow's finding that Total Estate in slaves was 15.9 percent of the 1860 total.22 The Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds accounts report net worth for households is about $90 trillion in 2016. If Soltow's percentage is applied to that data, the result is again approximately $14 trillion. In case anyone think that a relatively small number, it is roughly 77 percent of GDP today.
If Wright's figures above are adjusted to today's prices through the use of the relative share of GDP measure, they tell the same story as the table below shows.
Table 5


Regional Wealth in 1850 and 1860
Billions of $2016 dollars

North
South
North
South

1850
1850
1860
1860
Total Wealth
$32,200
$20,500
$41,400
$ 26,800
Value of Slaves
-
$9,300
-
$12,950
Non-slave Wealth
$32,300
$11,200
$41,400
$13,800
It should be noted that wealth grows roughly 30 percent over the decade of the 1850s in both the North and South. However, in the South, the value of slaves grew about 40 percent over the decade, while non-slave wealth grew at only about 25 percent.23 Some economic historians have hypothesized that Southerners had so much wealth tied up in slaves that they did not invest sufficiently in other types of investments. This is a concept called "crowding out." Whether that is the reason or not, it is clear at the start of Civil War, the North had three times the amount of non-slave wealth as the South, and this discrepancy would be at least partly represented in factories and other capital that was an advantage in waging a war.


Conclusions

Slavery in the United States was an institution that had a large impact on the economic, political and social fabric on the country. This paper gives an idea of its economic magnitude in today's values. As noted in the introduction, they can be conservatively described as large.


Appendix

The following quotes are from users of MeasuringWorth making comments about the US dollar relative value calculator.
A slave purchased her freedom from her owner for $600 in 1794. This calculator says that equals over $13,400 today. How could a slave possibly earn that much money? This is for an academic book that's already been published, so I was asking the question just for my own information.
Thank you so much for this resource. I teach United States history in the middle school to put historical figures into perspective. When teaching about slavery, for instance, it helps students understand the Southern perspective to know that an African American slave ran about as much as a new car would today.
I teach English. I found the price for a slave back in 1830 could go up to $4000. Your calculator showed that this corresponds to almost $90,000. This would rather suggest, "care" than "kill" by the owner. The whole slavery issue seems to be presented too simplified to be true. The conflict cannot be understood.
I am writing a book on Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln estimated that in 1860 the total value of all slaves in the United States was equal to $2,000,000,000 (two billion dollars. I want to know what that equates to in today's dollars.
I am a retired physician, now occupied with reading about a variety of historical topics related to the U. S. Civil War. I am a volunteer at the Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library, Springfield, IL. A common question asked by visitors is the average cost of a slave in the South in 1860, and its equivalent in current dollars.
I am a middle school history teacher and am trying to explain to my students what it meant for a slave to be sold for $1000 in 1850. How much would that be now? I figure the CPI is the one that shows the data I need, but it is confusing to figure out which one fits my needs even with the descriptions. A person with limited economics background is left unsure.
When my father was researching his family's genealogy, he came upon an ancestor's will, which mentioned the dispositions of his 3 slaves. The adult male was first to be offered to his family if they could buy him for $700; otherwise he was to be sold at auction. No later mention was made of the slave and I don't know what happened to him. This was shocking to me. I know many people must have slave-owning ancestors, but to have actual documentation of this in my family, no matter how far back, was repulsive. I know this was a huge amount of money in pre-Civil War times, in the 1840's-50's, and I wanted to know the equivalent amount today. I am not sure which indicator I want to use or what I intend to do with the information.
I am dealing with history: During the Civil War slave owners were paid $300.00 per slave in order to "release" them so they could serve in the Union Army. I know that in 1864 $300 was a lot of money; I am interested in understanding what that amount would represent today..
I am researching compensation claims made after the Civil War of slaveholders loyal to the Union claiming compensation for the "value" of the slave, if said slave served in the Union army.
I was checking the cost of a prime field hand slave just before the American Civil War started, to see just how much of an investment one was at the time.


Bibliography

Carter, Susan B., Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard Sutch and Gavin Wright, editors, Historical Statistics of the United States: earliest times to the present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
Conrad, Alfred, and John Meyer. "The Economics of Slavery in the Antebellum South." Journal of Political Economy, vol. 66, no. 2, April 1958.
David, Paul, Herbert Gutman, Richard Sutch, Peter Temin, and Gavin Wright. Reckoning with Slavery: A Critical Study in the Quantitative History of American Slavery. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976.
Fogel, Robert William. "A Comparison between the Value of Slave Capital in the Share of Total British Wealth (c.1811) and in the Share of Total Southern Wealth (c.1860)," chapter 56 of Robert William Fogel, Ralph A. Galantine, and Richard L. Manning, Without Consent or Contract: Evidence and Methods. New York: Norton, 1992.
Fogel, Robert William. Without Consent or Contract: The Rise and Fall of American Slavery. New York: W. W. Norton, 1989.
Fogel, Robert William, and Stanley Engerman. Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery, 2 vols. Boston: Little, Brown, 1974.
Gray, Lewis Cecil, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860. Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1933, p. 566
Kotlikoff, Laurence J. "Quantitative Description of the New Orleans Slave Market, 1804 to 1862," chapter 3 of Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, Without Consent or Contract: Markets and Production: Technical Papers, Volume 1 (New York: Norton, 1992), reprinted from Economic Inquiry, vol. 17, no. 4, October 1979.
Officer, Lawrence H. and Samuel H. Williamson "What Was the Value of the US Consumer Bundle Then?" MeasuringWorth, 2017a. URL: http://www.measuringworth.org/consumer/
Officer, Lawrence H. and Samuel H. Williamson "The Annual Consumer Price Index for the United States, 1774-2009," MeasuringWorth, 2017b. URL: http://www.measuringworth.org/uscpi/
Officer, Lawrence H., and Samuel H. Williamson, "Measures of Worth," MeasuringWorth, 2017. URL http://www.measuringworth.com/worthmeasures.html
Olmstead, Alan, and Paul Rhode, Creating Abundance: Biological Innovation and American Agricultural Development. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Ransom, Roger and Richard Sutch, "Capitalists without Capital: The Burden of Slavery and the Impact of Emancipation," Agricultural History 62 (3) (1988)
Soltow, Lee, Men and Wealth in the United States 1850-1870 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).
Wright, Gavin. Slavery and American Economic Development. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006.
* The authors thank Stanley Engerman, Richard Sutch, Gavin Wright, and Robert Whaples for their comments on a previous draft as well as participants in the Northern Illinois University Economics workshop and the 2010 All-UC conference. Previous versions:
Measuring Slavery in 2009 Dollars
Measuring Slavery in 2011 Dollars
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1 It is not clear when slavery became an organized system for labor in the colonies, but there is evidence that enslaved people were here from the beginning. There is also evidence that slaves purchased in Virginia in the early 1600s were treated in a manner similar to indentured servants (i.e., they were given their freedom and some land after a period of years.) The following quote is from Tim Hashaw, the author of The Birth of Black America: The First African Americans and the Pursuit of Freedom in Jamestown (Carroll & Graf)
"The Africans who arrived in Jamestown in 1619 did so by chance. In Angola more than 300 of them had been packed aboard the San Juan Bautista, bound for Mexico. As the Spanish slaver entered the Gulf of Mexico, two English privateers, the White Lion and the Treasurer, set upon it. The pirates hoped they'd corralled a treasure ship. Discovering only human cargo, they took as many slaves as they could carry. The Earl of Warwick, a British aristocrat, owned the Treasurer, and the governor of Jamestown was the Earl's man, so the privateers carried their booty to the Virginia coast. There they sold about 30 slaves, roughly split between males and females, to five or six plantation owners."
See http://www.chron.com/life/books/article/Book-discusses-African- slaves-their-struggle-for-1635362.php
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2 Susan B. Carter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard Sutch and Gavin Wright, editors, Historical Statistics of the United States: earliest times to the present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), series Bb212.
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3 Between 1804 and 1862, 135,000 slaves were sold on the New Orleans market. Kotlikoff, "Quantitative Description of the New Orleans Slave Market, 1804 to 1862" (1979)
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4 These costs are an obligation of the slave owner even when the slave is too young, old or infirm to work. There is ample evidence that these slaves who were not productive did not receive as much food as the able bodied, but there is no evidence that they were allowed to starve.
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5 See Robert William Fogel, Without Consent or Contract: The Rise and Fall of American Slavery (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), Chapter 3.
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6 Present value is the value today of a series of payments, or a single payment, that will be received in the future. Money put in a bank or alternative investment today will grow over time depending on the interest rate. What is received in the future is principle plus interest. Present value calculations determine the amount of principle that is needed today in order to realize a given series of payments in the future.
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7 The main reason that New South Slaves had higher prices was that the soil was more fertile there, so plantations were more productive. See Alan Olmstead and Paul Rhode, Creating Abundance: Biological Innovation and American Agricultural Development. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008.
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8 See Fogel, op. cit., pp. 69-70.
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9 Of course, the number had different meaning to the slave. However, as there were cases where slaves bought their own freedom, the opportunity cost question is the same.
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10 Lawrence H. Officer and Samuel H. Williamson, "Measures of Worth," MeasuringWorth, 2008. URL: http://www.measuringworth.com/worthmeasures.html
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11 A fourth measure, economic power, is used in our discussion of the magnitude of the wealth represented by the ownership of slaves.
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12 In his famous history of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860, published in 1933, Lewis Gray writes "Planters preferred to employ their own slaves rather than hire them to others.
Because of the scarcity of efficient white labor, demand for Negro artisans was usually considerable, and good wages were offered for their services. Unskilled labor was in demand for lumbering, mining, the constructions of canals and railways, steamboating, dock labor, and other 'public works.'" p. 566
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13 Unskilled workers today are those who have less than a high school education.
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14 Lewis Gray, op. cit, p. 566
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15 While it might be better to make the comparisons using average wealth then and now, those numbers are not available. There is evidence, however, that wealth and income are closely related and move up and down together.
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16 See Lawrence Officer, "What Was the Value of the US Consumer Bundle Then?" MeasuringWorth, 2009a,and Offficer, "The Annual Consumer Price Index for the United States, 1774-2009," MeasuringWorth, 2009b.
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17 Today the share of food and beverages of the average household is 15% and most of the cost of housing is to maintain a residence that is owned.
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18 Lee Soltow, Men and Wealth in the United States 1850-1870 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).
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19 Soltow, op. cit., p. 181.
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20 To understand how MeasuringWorth distinguishes between relative earnings and economic power, consider two economies. In the first economy there are 999 people who have $10,000 in wealth and a rich person who has $250,000. The rich person has great "status" over the rest, but his or her wealth is only two and a half percent of the total. In the second economy there are people, 49 people who have $10,000 in wealth and a rich person with $250,000. The rich person owns a third of all the wealth in this economy. In both cases the rich person is 25 more wealthy than the rest of the society, but in the second case he or she controls 13 times more of the total and has much more economic power.
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21 That amount of wealth in slave was calculate by Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch as the product of a three-year moving average of slave prices and the size of the slave population.
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22 Most economic historians feel the slave prices in 1860 were artificially high for a variety of reasons and that even without the War, they would have fallen, so these comparisons of wealth somewhat overstate the wealth of the South at the time.
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23 The percent figure was calculated by Fogel from Soltow: Robert W. Fogel, "A Comparison between the Value of Slave Capital in the Share of Total British Wealth (c.1811) and in the Share of Total Southern Wealth (c.1860)," chapter 56 of Robert William Fogel, Ralph A. Galantine, and Richard L. Manning, Without Consent or Contract: Evidence and Methods (New York: Norton, 1992.
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Citation

Samuel H. Williamson & Louis Cain, "Measuring Slavery in 2016 dollars," MeasuringWorth, 2019.
URL: www.measuringworth.com/slavery.php